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14192 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves the prosecution of appellant 
for the crime of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance for value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court and a guilty 
verdict was rendered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the verdict of guilty 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was submitted to the trial court on 
stipulated facts as contained in the transcript and 
record. The transcript indicates that three cases were 
before the court, each relating to an alleged sale of a 
controlled substance by the defendant to an undercover 
agent (T.22-23). The police records of the incidents 
were entered into evidence by stipulation (T. 18). 
The trial court found the defendant guilty in 
two cases and not guilty in the third case. The court 
based its not guilty verdict as to the incident of 
December 30, 1974, on a finding that defendant was 
acting as the agent of the undercover officer rather 
than the agent of the seller of the controlled substance 
(T.22-23). 
However, as to the incidents of January 10, 
1975, and January 17, 1975, the court found that the 
sales were in fact made by the defendant to the officer 
and thus a guilty finding was entered by the court (T.23). 
Defendant is herein appealing only one guilty 
finding relating to the incident of January 10, 1975 (R.6). 
Since the transcript merely incorporates the police 
report without setting out the pertinent facts (T.21), 
respondent believes the Supreme Court would find it helpful 
if the facts relating to the incident of January 10, 1975, 
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were here summarized from the police report and from the 
transcript. 
The police report on the incident of January-
10, 1975, reflects a meeting between defendant and 
the undercover officer at the Big Union Bar in Salt 
Lake City. The two had met at least once before on 
December 30, 1974, as defendant testified (T.21). 
The officer asked defendant to "score" a lid of mari-
juana for the officer. The defendant told the officer 
to come by his house later that evening. When the 
officer arrived the defendant handed him a bag 
containing marijuana (T.21). The officer gave the 
defendant a ten dollar bill but the defendant stated 
that his friend wanted twelve dollars for the lid. 
The officer gave defendant another two dollars. 
Defendant then gave the money to an unidentified 
individual in the room. The officer then left defendant's 
home. 
The defendant testified that he did not make 
any profit from the transaction of January 10, 1975 (T.23). 
The clerk of the Supreme Court has informed 
respondent that the undercover officer's report of the 
incident appealed, that of January 10, 1975, is an 
unnumbered part of the record in the instant case and 
-3-
is contained in a sealed envelope. The envelope,, the 
transcript and the record have all been filed together 
under Supreme Court number 14192. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLANT ACTED AS THE 
AGENT OF THE SELLER IN THE SALE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
FOR VALUE TO AN UNDERCOVER AGENT. 
Appellant relies heavily upon the holding in 
State v. Schultz, 28 Utah 2d 240, 501 P.2d 106 (1972), 
in arguing that under Utah law one cannot be convicted 
as a seller of drugs if he acts merely as the procuring 
agent of the buyer in an illegal drug sale without 
receiving any profit from the sale. The Schultz case 
and the numerous cases cited by appellant from juris-
dictions other than Utah involved violations of the 
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, since repealed by the Utah 
Legislature. 
The instant case involves an action brought 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1953), as amended, 
prohibiting the unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance for value. A recent case also involving Utah 
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Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) expands upon the holding in 
State v. Schultz, supra, and offers additional guidelines 
in interpreting whether one who procures drugs for another 
can be convicted as the distributor of a controlled 
substance for value. 
Respondent submits that both this recent 
decision from the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Shupe, 
P.2d (Utah, 1976, No. 14136), and State v. Schultz, 
supra, squarely support the conviction of appellant for the 
offense of unlawfully distributing a controlled substance 
for value. 
As appellant points out, State v. Schultz, 27 
Utah 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (Utah 1972), was first before 
the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of entrapment. 
Schultz's conviction was affirmed. On rehearing, the 
issue of agency was raised and the Court found the 
following facts pertinent: 
1. The defendant was induced by the undercover 
officer to procure the controlled substance as the agent 
of the officer. 
2. The defendant had no past association with 
the actual seller. 
3. The defendant was not acting in concert 
with the seller. 
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4. The defendant received no profit from the 
transaction. 
The existence of the aforementioned facts 
required the reversal of Shultz's conviction as a seller 
of a controlled substance for value. A new trial was 
ordered for Schultz requiring an instruction to the jury 
on the issue of agency. 
I n
 State v. Shupe, supra, the Court notes that 
a claim that one acted as an agent of the police in 
procuring drugs is closely akin to a claim of entrapment. 
The crucial question is whether the crime is the result 
of inducement by the officer rather than a product of the 
defendant's own intent. As provided by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-303 (1953), as amended, conduct merely providing one 
with the opportunity to commit a crime cannot constitute 
the defense of entrapment. .^  .. 
As always, cippellant's arguments must be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court in a light most favorable to the 
decision of the trial court. Charlton v. Hackett, 11 
Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). The trial court clearly 
measured the facts in the instant case against those in 
Schultz in finding appellant guilty of the offense of 
selling a controlled substance for value (T.23). The 
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facts relative to the incident of January 10, 1975, 
are far removed from the facts in Schultz which led 
the Supreme Court to conclude that Schultz was an agent 
of the undercover officer rather than the agent of the 
seller. 
First, after the officer asked appellant if 
a lid of marijuana could be purchased, appellant told 
the officer to come by appellant's home a short time 
later that evening. The fact that appellant used his 
own home as the place of the sale provides support for 
the argument that he was acting as the agent of the 
seller. 
Secondly, after the undercover officer handed 
appellant a ten dollar bill for the marijuana, appellant 
stated that his friend wanted twelve dollars for the 
lid. The fact that appellant quickly stated that the 
price was more than the officer offered certainly suggests 
that appellant had a past association with the seller. 
As to the third criterion set forth in 
Schultz, appellant's knowledge of the price over and 
above what the undercover officer expected to pay for 
a lid of marijuana, and the use of appellant's house 
for the transaction both strongly suggest that appellant 
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and the seller were acting in concert. 
Finally, the fourth factor of importance 
considered in Schultz was whether the defendant 
received a profit from the transaction. Appellant 
herein testified that he received no profit from 
the sale of marijuana on January 10, 1975 (T.23). 
The trial court found defendant's denial that he 
shared on the profits from the sale to be an 
unimportant factor in the court's decision. 
Respondent would also point out the self-serving 
nature of that testimony and urge the Supreme Court 
to weigh the facts in the instant case against the 
first three criteria in Schultz. 
As the trial court concluded, the facts 
in the police report on the incident of January 10, 
1975, require the finding that appellant had the 
intent to commit the crime charged as the agent 
of the seller of the controlled substance. Both 
Schultz and Shupe require such a finding. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the aforementioned authorities and 
argument, the verdict of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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